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Respondent Self-Focus and the Internal Consistency
of the Motivational Style Profile
Kenneth M. Cramer, Kathryn D. Lafreniere, and Phillip A. Ianni
University of Windsor
One of the underlying tenets of both personality and social psychological theory assumes that
questionnaire respondents have access to their thoughts and feelings. The same tenet under-
lies the various reversal theory states (e.g., telic/paratelic, negativism/conformity, autic mas-
tery/sympathy, alloic mastery/sympathy), so that individuals who are more internally focused
should have better access to their internal states and have higher internal consistency ratings
across all measures. To evaluate this tenet, 620 participants recruited from a community sam-
ple completed a questionnaire that included the Motivational Style Profile and three self-focus
measures: self-monitoring, identity formation, and private self-consciousness. Participants
were divided (by median split) into low and high self-focus categories for each measure. Re-
sults showed that highly self-focused individuals had significantly higher internal consistency
estimates. Implications for the psychometric properties of the MSP are discussed, as are direc-
tions for future research.
Keywords: reversal theory, self-focus, reliability, psychometrics
Along with validity, reliability is one of the key under-
lying principles in measurement theory. Self-report inven-
tories typically used by social science researchers (in vari-
ous fields, including personality, motivation, and social psy-
chology) are assumed to be reliable (Streiner, Norman, &
Cairney, 2014). Scales that have low internal consistency are
problematic because they indicate the constituent items differ
substantially from one another so as to suggest they do not
measure the same unitary construct (Miller, Lovler, & McIn-
tire, 2013). Furthermore, low test reliability can reduce the
magnitude of correlations and diminish their statistical sig-
nificance (Siegrist, 1996; Streiner et al., 2014). Additionally,
it is reasonable to speculate that internal consistency could be
affected by individual difference (personality) variables, par-
ticularly those that render a person more in touch with his/her
thoughts and feelings (hereafter referred to as “self-focus”).
That is, the internal consistency (reliability) of a scale may
be greater or enhanced for participants who are more self-
reflective and introspective. To use an example, when re-
search participants are asked to reflect on their psychological
Kenneth M. Cramer, Department of Psychology, University of
Windsor; Kathryn D. Lafreniere, Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Windsor; Phillip Ianni, Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Windsor.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed
to Kenneth M. Cramer, Psychology Department, University of
Windsor, 401 Sunset Ave., Windsor, ON, N9B 3P4, Canada.,
E-mail: kcramer@uwindsor.ca
state, attitude, or opinion (on for instance the death penalty),
those with greater self-focus will be capable of reflecting
thoughtfully on the question, and render more accurate and
reliable data; less pensive or self-focused individuals are less
inclined toward self-exploration of their thoughts and feel-
ings; by this, their responses are rendered more variable, and
less reliable. Establishing a link between self-focus and a
scale’s internal consistency should invite researchers to se-
lect participants who possess this inward accessibility, so that
scientific hypothesis testing is more precise.
Reversal theory offers a unique arena for an eval-
uation of this hypothesis. Reversal theory (Apter,
2001) is a meta-motivational framework that posits peo-
ple alternate between opposing pairs of metamotivational
states (e.g., telic/paratelic, arousal avoidance/seeking, neg-
ativism/conformity, autic mastery/sympathy, alloic mas-
tery/sympathy); each can be assessed using the Motivational
Style Profile (MSP; Apter, Mallows, & Williams, 1998).
Whereas the retest reliabilities among the MSP scales are
expected to be low (due to the transitory nature of reversal
states over short and especially over long periods of time),
the MSP subscales need still be internally consistent to of-
fer researchers confidence in their reliable and valid mea-
surement (Cramer, 2013). Most MSP subscales demonstrate
good internal consistency (alphas > .70), but some in partic-
ular, such as conformity and autic mastery subscales, exhibit
unacceptably lower reliability (Lafreniere & Cramer, 2006).
The unreliability of these subscales casts doubt on their as-
sociations with other constructs, and may produce spurious
empirical results in the form of false positive or negative out-
26
INCREASING THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE MSP 27
comes (Type I and Type II errors respectively), and one could
never know which (Field, 2014; Howell, 2012).
There are various means by which researchers can aug-
ment a scale’s internal consistency (Miller et al., 2013).
Whereas one may opt to develop a set of new items, this
method can prove time consuming and in some cases even
fruitless. A second option involves identifying what may be
the systematic source for the unreliability, namely that the
systematic error variance of an instrument is tied to a rel-
evant internal disposition (personality trait). If we use this
trait to identify and exclude participants for whom the scale
has low reliability, we may find that the reliability of these
scales has been rendered artifactually low. This raises the
question: which traits can be used for this purpose?
One likely candidate is a family of traits known as self-
focus (alternatively known as “self-awareness”). It is be-
lieved that individuals who are more self-focused have higher
internal consistency ratings because they have better access
to their internal states (Cramer, 2000; Hergenhahn, Olson, &
Cramer, 2015). Answering items on a questionnaire that tries
to measure a given attitude, opinion, attribution, state, or trait
promotes an introspective quest for the answer, causing indi-
viduals to direct their attention inwardly, toward themselves
(Siegrist, 1996). Research shows that self-focused atten-
tion increases awareness of internal states (Scheier & Carver,
1977). Situations too can promote self-awareness and reduce
the likelihood of minor transgressions. Beaman, Klentz, Di-
ener, and Svanum (1979) demonstrated that by placing a mir-
ror behind an unguarded candy bowl, Halloween trick-or-
treaters were more likely to observe the stipulated instruc-
tion to select only one candy. Finally, greater self-awareness
allows individuals to focus on aspects of themselves that are
relevant to the construct assessed by the questionnaire. This
greater self-awareness enables individuals who are more self-
focused to be able to respond to questionnaires in a more
consistent manner.
There are three key conceptions of self-focus in the liter-
ature: self-monitoring, identity formation, and private self-
consciousness.
Self-monitoring is defined as “self-observation and self-
control guided by situational cues to social appropriateness”
(Snyder, 1974, p. 526). It depends on having awareness
of one’s own internal states. Because of this, it is plausible
that self-monitoring would be associated with responding in
a more consistent manner.
From an identity formation perspective, Marcia (2010)
suggests that self-focus has its roots in one’s identity, which
is gained through self-reflection (Erikson, 1963). Individuals
who have a more established, committed identity are better
able to engage in self-reflection when responding to items
about traits and internal states. Presumably, individuals with
a stronger sense of identity would respond more consistently.
Private self-consciousness is defined as a tendency to
attend to one’s inner feelings and thoughts (Fenigstein,
Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Individuals scoring high on private
self-consciousness have better access to their own internal
states. Previous research (McFarland & Sparks, 1985; Hjelle
& Barnard, 1994; Nasby, 1989; Siegrist, 1996) has shown
that private self-consciousness is associated with greater re-
liability.
Several empirical investigations track the impact of re-
spondent self-focus on scale psychometrics, specifically that
self-focus relates to higher reliability. McFarland and Sparks
(1985) found that private self-consciousness contributed
unique variance in predicting consistency scores. However,
because McFarland and Sparks did not use Cronbach’s alpha,
cautious interpretation is warranted. Results of two other
studies (Hjelle & Bernard, 1994; Nasby, 1989) showed that
retest reliability was higher for participants with high levels
of private self-consciousness compared to low-level respon-
dents. It is noteworthy that since these studies assessed retest
reliability (not internal consistency), their findings are not
directly relevant to the current investigation.
One study (Siegrist, 1996) showed that participants scor-
ing high on private self-consciousness had higher internal
consistency scores on measures of self-representation and
satisfaction (alphas = .924 and .947 respectively) compared
to participants scoring low on private self-consciousness
(.766 and .829, respectively). On a measure of inner speech,
there was a marginally significant difference between par-
ticipants who scored high on private self-consciousness vs.
those who scored low (.915 vs .840). These results are alone
in showing that greater self-focus is associated with higher
internal consistency reliability as measured by Cronbach’s
alpha.
The present study extends this pursuit to the challenge of
internal consistency estimates among reversal theory mea-
sures (Cramer, 2013). It was hypothesized that respondents
who scored high on measures of self-focus should demon-
strate significantly higher internal consistency estimates on
the MSP state dominance measures compared to those who
scored low.
Method
Participants
There were 214 male and 408 female members from the
community who agreed to participate. The bulk of the sam-
ple (n = 367; 59%) was comprised of students in an introduc-
tory psychology class at the University of Windsor in south-
western Ontario, Canada who completed the study for partial
course credit. However, in an effort to both increase sample
size and to diversify the sample, each student had the op-
tion of recruiting someone from the community so as to earn
an additional bonus credit. This snowball sampling method
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augmented the sample, obtaining approximately 40% of the
respondents. The sample as a whole had an average age of
24.7 years (SD = 6.1); 84.5% were self-identified as Cau-
casian, 3.2% Black, 4.5% Asian, 0.3% Native, and 7.4% of
another category; 86.2% indicated that English was their first
language. The student and community groups were not sig-
nificantly different with respect to these demographic vari-
ables, nor with respect to the self-focus or reversal theory
measures.
Measures and Procedure
After providing informed consent, respondents completed
a series of self-report questionnaires in a pencil-paper book-
let, consisting (in a random order) of the following measures.
Upon completion, respondents were debriefed as to the pro-
cedure and hypotheses.
Motivational style was assessed using the 70-item MSP
(Apter et al., 1998), where responses ranged from 1 = ‘never’
to 6 = ‘always.’ We examined 8 of the 14 subscales: telic,
paratelic, negativism, conformity, autic mastery, autic sym-
pathy, alloic mastery, and alloic sympathy. Whereas many of
these subscales demonstrate adequate internal consistency,
previous research (Ianni & Lafreniere, 2014; Lafreniere,
Menna, & Cramer, 2013; Lafreniere & Cramer, 2006; Sit
& Lindner, 2005) identifies two – the conformity and autic
mastery subscales – with unacceptably low reliabilities.
Self-focus was assessed with three questionnaires (all uni-
tary constructs) designed to measure different facets of the
construct, namely self-monitoring, identity formation, and
private self-consciousness.
Self-monitoring was assessed using the 18-item Lennox
and Wolfe Scale (1984). High scorers are able to monitor
and adjust their behaviour in social situations. Internal con-
sistency estimates from several sources (Cramer & Gruman,
2002; Deeter-Schmelz & Ramsey, 2010) reveal adequate re-
liability (.75), with a stable and replicable factor structure
(sample item: “In social situations, I have the ability to alter
my behavior if I feel that something else is called for”).
Identity formation, based on Erikson’s model of psy-
chosocial development, was assessed using the 5-point, 19-
item Identity Formation Scale (Ochse & Plug, 1986; see also
Darling-Fisher & Klein Leady, 1988; Domino & Affonso,
1990). Internal consistency estimates range from .75 to .83,
and correlate with other measures of identity growth (sample
item: “I wonder what sort of person I really am”).
Private self-consciousness was assessed using the 4–point,
7-item Private Self-Consciousness subscale of the Fenigstein
Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Scheier
and Carver (1985) supported the internal consistency (.79)
and retest reliability after 4-weeks (sample item: “I’m always
trying to figure myself out”).
Results
A significance level of .05 was utilized for all statistical
analyses. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, stan-
dard deviation, alpha values, and scale intercorrelations) for
all measures. Results showed mild nonnormality among all
variables; however, conversion to standardized ranked vari-
ables did not alter the study’s conclusions. A preliminary
analysis of the three self-focus variables by age and gender
show several interesting but inconsistent correlations (p <
.05). For females, age was positively correlated with iden-
tity formation, r(339) = .29 but negatively correlated with
self-consciousness, r(326) = -.17. For males, age was nega-
tively correlated with both self-monitoring, r(184) = -.38 and
private self-consciousness, r(192) = -.45.
Table 1 offers a lower-triangle correlation matrix of all
measures. Despite measuring seemingly comparable con-
structs, the three self-focus measures were only modestly
correlated. This suggests the three measures (while arguably
inter-related) tap relatively unique components of self-focus.
It is particularly noteworthy that some measures of self-focus
correlated significantly with most measures of both the autic
and alloic dominances, as one might predict.
For each of the three measures of self-focus, participants
were divided by median split into low vs. high self-focus
categories. Though some critics (see MacCallum, Zhang,
Preacher, & Rucker, 2002) argue against using this tech-
nique, we maintain that the sample is sufficiently large to
suffer little reduction in power via this procedure. So too,
because distinct groups are necessary for this analysis, one
alternative is to divide the sample into thirds, deleting the
middle section of respondents. Despite the loss of sample
size (by approximately 200 respondents), the results (and
conclusions) remained the same. The internal consistency of
each subscale was calculated separately for high self-focus
and low self-focus participants.
Differences in internal consistencies (as measured using
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients) between the high and low
groups were evaluated using Feldt’s (1969) test statistic (see
also Hakstian & Whalen, 1976). Table 2 shows the 1-tailed
comparison test between high and low self-focus participants
by each measure.
Participants scoring higher on self-monitoring had signif-
icantly higher internal consistencies (by approximately .04
points) than participants scoring lower for the paratelic, autic
mastery, and alloic mastery MSP subscales.
Participants scoring higher on identity formation had sig-
nificantly higher internally consistencies (again by approx-
imately .04 points) than participants scoring lower for the
telic, negativism, conformity, and alloic mastery MSP sub-
scales.
Participants scoring higher on private self-consciousness
had significantly higher internal consistencies (by approx-
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Table 2
Internal Consistency of Cronbach’s α Values for Participants with High and Low Scores on
Self-Monitoring, Identity Formation, and Private Self-Consciousness, with Sample Sizes and
p-values of differences.
Self-Monitoring Identity Formation Private Self-Consciousness
Low High pa Low High pa Low High pa
n 286 336 281 341 294 328
Telic .68 .68 n.s. .64 .71 .014 .68 .73 .033
Paratelic .65 .71 .025 .66 .69 n.s. .69 .70 n.s.
Negativism .82 .83 n.s. .81 .84 .032 .79 .84 .004
Conformity .50 .49 n.s. .47 .55 .037 .46 .54 .039
Autic Mastery .53 .62 .015 .59 .62 n.s. .50 .67 .001
Autic Sympathy .73 .76 n.s. .76 .78 n.s. .71 .78 .004
Alloic Mastery .75 .88 .001 .77 .84 .001 .81 .85 .009
Alloic Sympathy .71 .72 n.s. .69 .68 n.s. .70 .75 .027
Note. a one-tailed p values using Feldt’s (1969) test statistic for comparing Cronbach’s alphas
imately .07 points) than participants scoring lower for all
MSP subscales except paratelic.
These findings provide support for the underlying assump-
tion of self-focus as a dimension in various reversal orienta-
tions.
Discussion
Our results supported the hypothesis that greater self-
focus was associated with more consistent responding on
the MSP. Across all three measures, self-focused individ-
uals had significantly higher internal consistency estimates
for most of the MSP subscales. The difference in alpha
coefficients between high and low self-focused individuals
was particularly robust and consistent for the autic mastery
and alloic mastery subscales. There was a significant dif-
ference in alpha scores between low and high-self focus for
all three self-focus measures for the alloic mastery subscale.
For four subscales (telic, negativism, conformity, and au-
tic mastery), there was a significant difference in internal
consistency coefficients for two of the three self-focus mea-
sures. Although significant, these differences were generally
of relatively small magnitude (approximately .05). How-
ever, the magnitude of the difference was particularly high
using the private self-consciousness measure for autic mas-
tery, where the alpha was .17 points higher for those scoring
high on private self-consciousness. It appears that individ-
uals with higher self-focus did not exhibit higher reliability
than low-scoring respondents for the alloic sympathy (with
a difference only noticeable for private self-consciousness)
and paratelic subscales (with a difference only noticeable
for self-monitoring). It is not clear why the private self-
consciousness groups had more and larger differences in re-
liabilities. Future researchers would do well to delve deeper
into the nomological network and theoretical basis of still
other self-focus constructs.
Our results are similar to those of Siegrist (1996). How-
ever, our study is an important addition to the literature as it is
the first to test whether the apparent reliability-enhancing ef-
fects of self-focus extend to reversal theory. Another strength
of the present study was the addition of two other measures
of self-focus: self-monitoring and identity formation. Future
research might consider Langer’s (1989; Carson & Langer,
2006) concept of mindfulness as an additional avenue toward
testing the self-focus hypothesis.
Of greatest interest were the conformity and autic mas-
tery subscales, due to their low reliability (Lafreniere &
Cramer, 2006). These findings suggest that self-focus (or
lack thereof) may account for the low internal consistency
reliability of the autic mastery subscale. For the participants
who scored high on private self-consciousness, the autic mas-
tery subscale had an adequate alpha value of .67. Consistent
with reversal theory, individuals “cannot be in the mastery
state unless [they] are regularly experiencing self-awareness”
(Fontana, 1988, p. 353). This suggests that self-awareness is
prerequisite for being in the autic mastery state. Highly self-
focused individuals have more self-awareness, so it is plausi-
ble that they would be better able to answer the autic mastery
questions in a consistent manner.
In contrast, reliability remained low for the conformity
subscale – even for individuals high in self-focus. Even for
the participants who scored high on identity formation, the
conformity subscale had an alpha value of only .55. Thus,
self-focus does not appear to account for the low reliability
of the conformity subscale. Unlike autic mastery, conformity
is an other-oriented state characterized by the need to obey
rules and meet the demands of others (Apter et al., 1998).
In a conformity state, individuals turn their focus away from
themselves, rendering the benefit of self-focus minimal. This
may explain why self-focus appears to have a relatively small
impact on participant responding to conformity items.
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It is reasonable to speculate that the low reliability of some
MSP subscales (especially autic mastery) may occur because
they are particularly susceptible to low self-focus. Low lev-
els of self-focus may reduce the reliability of these subscales.
The low reliability of these subscales may be improved by
screening out participants who are low in self-focus.
Our results raise several additional questions. Do respon-
dents higher in self-focus make better research participants?
That is, might we expect – when using these participants –
to see significantly higher correlations between measures,
or more powerful statistical tests with augmented sensitiv-
ity. Should researchers prescreen the participants in studies
(particularly reversal theory studies) in hopes of recruiting
those highly self-focused individuals to ensure a greater like-
lihood of significant results? Are highly self-focused respon-
dents less likely to be yea-sayers? Certainly, more research
is needed to answer these questions.
References
Apter, M. J. (2001). Motivational styles in everyday life:
A guide to Reversal Theory. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Apter, M. J., Mallows, R., & Williams, S. (1998). The devel-
opment of the Motivational Style Profile. Personality and
Individual Differences, 24(1), 7–18. doi: 10.1016/S0191-
8869(97)00148-7
Beaman, A. L., Klentz, B., Diener, E., & Svanum, S. (1979).
Self-awareness and transgression in children: Two field
studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37,
1835-1846.
Carson, S. H., & Langer, E. J. (2006). Mindfulness and self-
acceptance. Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-
Behavior Therapy, 24, 29-43. doi: 10.1007/s10942-006-
0022-5
Cramer, K. M. (2000). Comparing the relative fit of vari-
ous factor models of the self-consciousness scale in two
independent samples. Journal of Personality Assessment,
75(2), 295–307. doi: 10.1207/S15327752JPA7502_9
Cramer, K. M. (2013). Six criteria of a viable theory: Putting
reversal theory to the test. Journal of Motivation, Emotion,
and Personality, 1(1), 9–16. doi: 10.12689/jmep.2013.102
Cramer, K. M., & Gruman, J. A. (2002). The Lennox and
Wolfe Revised Self-Monitoring Scale: Latent structure
and gender invariance. Personality and Individual Differ-
ences, 32, 627-637.
Darling-Fisher, C. S., & Kline Leady, N. (1988). Measuring
Eriksonian development in the adult: The Modified Erik-
son Psychosocial Stage Inventory. Psychological Reports,
62, 747-754.
Deeter-Schmelz, D. R., & Ramsey, R. P. (2010). A psy-
chometric assessment of the Lennox and Wolfe Self-
Monitoring Scale in the sales force. Industrial Marketing
Management, 39, 1162-1169.
Domino, G., & Affonso, D. D. (1990). A personality mea-
sure of Erikson’s life stages: The Inventory of Psychoso-
cial Balance. Journal of Personality Assessment, 54, 576-
588.
Erikson, E. H. (1963). Childhood and society (2nd ed.). New
York: Norton.
Feldt, L. S. (1969). A test of the hypothesis that Cronbach’s
αor Kuder-Richardson coefficient twenty is the same for
two tests. Psychometrika, 34, 363-373.
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Pub-
lic and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522–
527.
Field, A. (2014). Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS
Statistics: And sex and drugs and rock ‘n’ roll (4th ed.).
Washington, DC: Sage.
Fontana, D. (1988). Self-awareness and self-forgetting: Now
I see me, now I don’t. In M. J. Apter, J. H. Kerr, & M. P.
Cowles (Eds.), Progress in reversal theory (pp. 349–357).
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Hakstian, A. R., & Whalen, T. E. (1976). A k-sample signif-
icance test for independent αcoefficients. Psychometrika,
41, 219-231.
Hjelle, L. A., & Bernard, M. (1994). Private self-
consciousness and the retest reliability of self-reports.
Journal of Research in Personality, 28, 52–67. doi:
10.1006/jrpe.1994.1006
Hergenhahn, B. R., Olson, M. H., & Cramer, K. M.
(2015). An introduction to theories of personality, 2nd ed.
Toronto: Prentice Hall.
Howell, D. C. (2012). Statistical methods for psychology
(8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Cengage.
Ianni, P. A., & Lafreniere, K. D. (2014). Personality
and motivational correlates of energy drink consump-
tion and misuse among female undergraduate students.
Personality and Individual Differences, 69, 110-114.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2014.05.022
Lafreniere, K. D., & Cramer, K. M. (2006). Examining re-
versal theory measures in relation to NEO personality di-
mensions and consideration of future consequences. Per-
sonality and Individual Differences, 40(7), 1387–1397.
doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2005.11.019.
Lafreniere, K. D., Menna, R., & Cramer, K. M. (2013). Re-
belliousness, effortful control, and risky behavior: Meta-
motivational and temperamental predictors of risk-taking
in older adolescents. Journal of Motivation, Emotion, and
Personality, 1, 17–26. doi: 10.12689/jmep.2013.103.
Langer, E. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley.
Lennox, R. D., & Wolfe, R. N. (1984). Revision of the Self-
Monitoring Scale. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 46, 1349-1364.
32 KENNETH M. CRAMER, KATHRYN D. LAFRENIERE, AND PHILLIP A. IANNI
MacCallum, R. C., Zhang, S., Preacher, K. J., & Rucker, D.
D. (2002). On the practice of dichotomization of quantita-
tive variables. Psychological Methods, 7(1), 19-40.
Marcia, J. E. (2010). Life transitions and stress in the context
of psychosocial development. In T.
W. Miller (Ed.), Handbook of stressful transitions across the
lifespan (pp.19-34). New York: Springer Science and
Business Media.
Miller, L. A., Lovler, R. L., & McIntire, S. A. (2013). Foun-
dations of psychological testing : A practical approach
(4th ed.). Washington, DC: Sage.
McFarland, S. G., & Sparks, C. M. (1985). Age, education,
and the internal consistency of personality scales. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1692–1702.
Nasby, W. (1989). Private self-consciousness, self-
awareness, and the reliability of self-reports. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 950–957.
Ochse, R., & Plug, C. (1986). Cross-cultural investigation
of the validity of Erikson’s theory of personality develop-
ment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50,
1240-1252.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1977). Self-focused atten-
tion and the experience of emotion: Attraction, repulsion,
elation, and depression. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 35, 625-636.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1985). The Self-
Consciousness Scale: A revised version for use with gen-
eral populations Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 15,
687-699.
Siegrist, M. (1996). The influence of self-consciousness
on the internal consistency of different scales. Per-
sonality and Individual Differences, 20, 115–117. doi:
10.1016/0191-8869(95)00138-V.
Sit, C. H. P., & Lindner, K. J. (2005). Motivational orienta-
tions in youth sport participation: Using achievement goal
theory and reversal theory. Personality and Individual Dif-
ferences, 38(3), 605-618. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2004.05.015
Snyder, M. (1974). The self-monitoring of expressive be-
havior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30,
526-537. Streiner, D. L., Norman, G. R., & Cairney, J.
(2014). Health measurement scales: A practical guide to
their development and use (5th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
